Knowledge extraction is a fundamental notion, modelling machine possession of values (witnesses) in a computational complexity sense. The notion provides an essential tool for cryptographic protocol design and analysis, enabling one to argue about the internal state of protocol players without ever looking at this supposedly secret state. However, when transactions are concurrent (e.g., over the Internet) with players possessing public-keys (as is common in cryptography), assuring that entities "know" what they claim to know, where adversaries may be well coordinated across different transactions, turns out to be much more subtle and in need of re-examination. Here, we investigate how to formally treat knowledge possession by parties (with registered public-keys) interacting over the Internet. Stated more technically, we look into the relative power of the notion of "concurrent knowledge-extraction" (CKE) in the concurrent zero-knowledge (CZK) bare public-key (BPK) model.
Introduction
Zero-knowledge (ZK) protocols allow a prover to assure a verifier of validity of theorems without giving away any additional knowledge (i.e., computational advantage) beyond validity. This notion was introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [43] and its generality was demonstrated by Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson [42] . Since its introduction ZK has found numerous useful applications, and by now has been playing a central role for modern cryptography (particularly in cryptographic protocol design [70, 41] ).
Traditional notion of ZK considers the security in a stand-alone (or sequential) execution of the protocol. Motivated by the use of such protocols in an asynchronous network like the Internet, where many protocols run simultaneously, studying security properties of ZK protocols in such concurrent
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We recall basic notions and tools in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe (an augmented version) of the BPK model with adaptive language selections based on public-keys. In Section 4, we present the motivation, by concrete attacks on naturally existing protocol, for concurrent knowledge-extractability in the public-key model. In Section 5, we formulate CKE in the BPK model, and make clarifications and justification of the CKE formulation. In Section 6, we present the generic implementation of constant-round CZK-CKE arguments for N P in the BPK model under standard hardness assumptions. In Section 7, we present the efficient and practical implementations of constant-round CZK-CKE arguments for N P in the BPK model with the usage of complexity leveraging in a minimal and novel way, and discuss and clarify in depth the various subtleties.
Preliminaries
We use standard notations and conventions below for writing probabilistic algorithms, experiments and interactive protocols. If A is a probabilistic algorithm, then A(x 1 , x 2 , · · · ; r) is the result of running A on inputs x 1 , x 2 , · · · and coins r. We let y ← A(x 1 , x 2 , · · · ) denote the experiment of picking r at random and letting y be A(x 1 , x 2 , · · · ; r). If S is a finite set then x ← S is the operation of picking an element uniformly from S. If α is neither an algorithm nor a set then x ← α is a simple assignment statement. By [R 1 ; · · · ; R n : v] we denote the set of values of v that a random variable can assume, due to the distribution determined by the sequence of random processes R 1 , R 2 , · · · , R n . By Pr[R 1 ; · · · ; R n : E] we denote the probability of event E, after the ordered execution of random processes R 1 , · · · , R n .
Let P, V be a probabilistic interactive protocol, then the notation (y 1 , y 2 ) ← P (x 1 ), V (x 2 ) (x) denotes the random process of running interactive protocol P, V on common input x, where P has private input x 1 , V has private input x 2 , y 1 is P 's output and y 2 is V 's output. We assume w.l.o.g. that the output of both parties P and V at the end of an execution of the protocol P, V contains a transcript of the communication exchanged between P and V during such execution.
The security of cryptographic primitives and tools presented in this section is defined with respect to uniform polynomial-time or sub-exponential-time algorithms (equivalently, polynomial-size or sub-exponential-size circuits). When it comes to non-uniform security, we refer to non-uniform Below, we recall some classic perfectly-binding commitment schemes. One-round perfectly-binding (computationally-hiding) commitments can be based on any oneway permutation OWP [8, 42] . Loosely speaking, given a OWP f with a hard-core predict b (cf. [34] ), on a security parameter n one commits a bit σ by uniformly selecting x ∈ {0, 1} n and sending (f (x), b(x) ⊕ σ) as a commitment, while keeping x as the decommitment information.
For practical perfectly-binding commitment scheme, in this work we use the DDH-based ElGamal (non-interactive) commitment scheme [29] . To commit to a value v ∈ Z q , the committer randomly selects u, r ∈ Z q , computes h = g u mod p and sends (h,ḡ = g r ,h = g v h r ) as the commitment. The decommitment information is (r, v). Upon receiving the commitment (h,ḡ,h), the receiver checks that h,ḡ,h are elements of order q in Z * p . It is easy to see that the commitment scheme is of perfectly-binding. The computational hiding property is from the DDH assumption on the subgroup of order q of Z * p (for more details, see [29] ). We also note that in [57] Micciancio and Petrank presented another implementation of DDH-based perfectly-binding commitment scheme with advanced security properties.
Statistically-binding commitments can be based on any one-way function (OWF) but run in two rounds [60, 45] . On a security parameter n, let P RG : {0, 1} n −→ {0, 1} 3n be a pseudorandom generator, the Naor's OWF-based two-round public-coin perfectly-binding commitment scheme works as follows: In the first round, the commitment receiver sends a random string R ∈ {0, 1} 3n to the committer. In the second round, the committer uniformly selects a string s ∈ {0, 1} n at first; then to commit a bit 0 the committer sends P RG(s) as the commitment; to commit a bit 1 the committer sends P RG(s) ⊕ R as the commitment. Note that the first-round message of Naor's commitment scheme can be fixed once and for all and, in particular, can be posted as a part of public-key in the public-key model. Feige-Shamir trapdoor commitments (FSTC) [31] . Based on Blum's protocol for DHC, Feige and Shamir developed a generic (computationally-hiding and computationally-binding) trapdoor commitment scheme [31] , under either any one-way permutation or any OWF (depending on the underlying perfectly-binding commitment scheme used). The T CP K of the FSTC scheme is (y = f (x), G) (for OWF-based solution, T CP K also includes a random string R serving as the firstround message of Naor's OWF-based perfectly-binding commitment scheme), where f is a OWF and G is a graph that is reduced from y by the Cook-Levin N P-reduction. The corresponding trapdoor is x (or equivalently, a Hamiltonian cycle in G). The following is the description of the Feige-Shamir trapdoor bit commitment scheme, on a security parameter n.
Round-1. Let f be a OWF, the commitment receiver randomly selects an element x of length n in the domain of f , computes y = f (x), reduces y (by Cook-Levin N P-reduction) to an instance of DHC, a graph G = (V, E) with q = |V | nodes, such that finding a Hamiltonian cycle in G is equivalent to finding the preimage of y. Finally, it sends (y, G) to the committer. We remark that to get OWF-based trapdoor commitments, the commitment receiver also sends a random string R of length 3n.
Round-2. The committer first checks the N P-reduction from y to G and aborts if G is not reduced from y. Otherwise, to commit to 0, the committer selects a random permutation, π, of the vertices V , and commits (using the underlying perfectly-binding commitment scheme) the entries of the adjacency matrix of the resultant permutated graph. That is, it sends an q-by-q matrix of commitments so that the (π(i), π(j)) th entry is a commitment to 1 if (i, j) ∈ E, and is a commitment to 0 otherwise; To commit to 1, the committer commits an adjacency matrix containing a randomly labeled q-cycle only.
Decommitment stage. To decommit to 0, the committer sends π to the commitment receiver along with the revealing of all commitments, and the receiver checks that the revealed graph is indeed isomorphic to G via π; To decommit to 1, the committer only opens the entries of the adjacency matrix that are corresponding to the randomly labeled cycle, and the receiver checks that all revealed values are 1 and the corresponding entries form a simple q-cycle.
Definition 2.5 (witness indistinguishability WI) Let P, V be an interactive system for a language L ∈ N P, and let R L be the fixed N P witness relation for L. That is, x ∈ L if there exists a w such that (x, w) ∈ R L . We denote by view P (w) V * (z) (x) a random variable describing the transcript of all messages exchanged between a (possibly malicious) PPT verifier V * and the honest prover P in an execution of the protocol on common input x, when P has auxiliary input w and V * has auxiliary input z. We say that P, V is witness indistinguishable for R L if for every PPT interactive machine V * , and every two sequences W 1 = {w 1 x } x∈L and W 2 = {w 2 x } x∈L for sufficiently long x, so that (x, w 1 x ) ∈ R L and (x, w 2 x ) ∈ R L , the following two probability distributions are computationally indistinguishable by any non-uniform polynomial-time algorithm: {x, view
V * (z) (x)} x∈L, z∈{0, 1} * . Namely, for every non-uniform polynomial-time distinguishing algorithm D, every polynomial p(·), all sufficiently long x ∈ L, and all z ∈ {0, 1} * , it holds that
Definition 2.6 (strong witness indistinguishability SWI) Let P, V and all other notations be as in Definition 2.5. We say that P, V is strongly witness-indistinguishable for R L if for every PPT interactive machine V * and for every two probability ensembles
WI vs. SWI: It is clarified in [35] that the notion of SWI actually refers to issues that are fundamentally different from WI. Specifically, the issue is whether the interaction with the prover helps V * to distinguish some auxiliary information (which is indistinguishable without such an interaction). Significantly different from WI, SWI does not preserve under concurrent composition. More details about SWI are referred to [35] . But, an interesting observation is: the protocol composing commitments and SWI can be itself regular WI.
Commit-then-SWI: Consider the following protocol composing a statistically-binding commitment and SWI:
Common input: x ∈ L for an N P-language L with corresponding N P-relation R L .
Prover auxiliary input: w such that (x, w) ∈ R L .
The protocol: consisting of two stages:
Stage-1: The prover P computes and sends c w = C(w, r w ), where C is a statistically-binding commitment and r w is the randomness used for commitment.
Then, P proves to V that it knows a witness to (x, c w ) ∈ L ′ , by running a SWI protocol.
One interesting observation for the above commit-then-SWI protocol is that commit-then-SWI is itself a regular WI for L.
Proposition 2.1 Commit-then-SWI is itself a regular WI for the language L.
Proof (of Proposition 2.1). For any PPT malicious verifier V * , possessing some auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1} * , and for any x ∈ L and two (possibly different) witnesses (w 0 , w 1 ) such that (x, w b ) ∈ R L for both b ∈ {0, 1}, consider the executions of commit-then-SWI: P (w 0 ), V * (z) (x) and P (w 1 ), V * (z) (x).
Note that for P (w b ), V * (z) (x), b ∈ {0, 1}, the input to SWI of Stage-2 is (x, c w b = C(w b , r w b )), and the auxiliary input to V * at the beginning of Stage-2 is (x, c w b , z). Note that (x, c w 0 , z) is indistinguishable from (x, c w 1 , z). Then, the regular WI property of the whole composed protocol is followed from the SWI property of Stage-2. Definition 2.7 (system for argument/proof of knowledge [34, 6] ) Let R be a binary relation and κ : N → [0, 1]. We say that a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) interactive machine V is a knowledge verifier for the relation R with knowledge error κ if the following two conditions hold:
• Non-triviality: There exists an interactive machine P such that for every (x, w) ∈ R all possible interactions of V with P on common input x and auxiliary input w are accepting.
• Validity (with error κ): There exists a polynomial q(·) and a probabilistic oracle machine K such that for every interactive machine P * , every x ∈ L R , and every w, r ∈ {0, 1} * , machine K satisfies the following condition:
Denote by p(x, w, r) the probability that the interactive machine V accepts, on input x, when interacting with the prover specified by P * x,w,r (where P * x,w,r denotes the strategy of P * on common input x, auxiliary input w and random-tape r). If p(x, w, r) > κ(|x|), then, on input x and with oracle access to P * x,w,r , machine K outputs a solution w ′ ∈ R(x) within an expected number of steps bounded by q(|x|) p(x, w, r) − κ(|x|)
The above definition of POK is with respect to deterministic prover strategy. POK also can be defined with respect to probabilistic prover strategy. It is recently shown that the two definitions are equivalent for all natural cases (e.g., POK for N P-relations) [6] .
We mention that Blum's protocol for directed Hamiltonian Cycle DHC [9] is just a 3-round public-coin WIPOK for N P, which is recalled below.
Blum's protocol for DHC [9] . The n-parallel repetitions of Blum's basic protocol for proving the knowledge of Hamiltonian cycle on a given directed graph G [9] is just a 3-round public-coin WIPOK for N P (with knowledge error 2 −n ) under any one-way permutation (as the first round of it involves one-round perfectly-binding commitments of a random permutation of G). But it can be easily modified into a 4-round public-coin WIPOK for N P under any OWF by employing Naor's two-round (public-coin) perfectly-binding commitment scheme [60] . The following is the description of Blum's basic protocol for DHC:
Prover's private input. A directed Hamiltonian cycle C G in G.
Round-1. The prover selects a random permutation, π, of the vertices V , and commits (using a perfectly-binding commitment scheme) the entries of the adjacency matrix of the resulting permutated graph. That is, it sends a q-by-q matrix of commitments so that the (π(i), π(j)) th entry is a commitment to 1 if (i, j) ∈ E, and is a commitment to 0 otherwise.
Round-2.
The verifier uniformly selects a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and sends it to the prover.
Round-3. If b = 0 then the prover sends π to the verifier along with the revealing of all commitments (and the verifier checks that the revealed graph is indeed isomorphic to G via π); If b = 1, the prover reveals to the verifier only the commitments to entries (π(i), π(j)) with (i, j) ∈ C G (and the verifier checks that all revealed values are 1 and the corresponding entries form a simple q-cycle).
We remark that the WI property of Blum's protocol for DHC relies on the hiding property of the underlying perfectly-binding commitment scheme used in its first-round.
Statistical WI argument/proof of knowledge (WIA/POK). We employ, in a critical way, constant-round statistical WIA/POK in this work. We briefly note two simple ways for achieving statistical WIA/POK systems. Firstly, for any statistical/perfect Σ-protocol (defined below), the OR-proof (i.e., the Σ OR -protocol) is statistical/perfect WI proof of knowledge. The second approach is to modify the (parallel repetition of) Blum's protocol for DHC [9] (that is computational WIPOK) into constant-round statistical WIAOK by replacing the statistically-binding commitments used in the first-round of Blum's protocol by constant-round statistically-hiding commitments. One-round statistically-hiding commitments can be based on any collision-resistant hash function [19, 48] . Tworound statistically-hiding commitments can be based on any claw-free collection with an efficiently recognizable index set [38, 36, 34] (statistically-hiding commitments can also be based on general assumptions, in particular any OWF, with non-constant rounds [61, 47, 46] ).
Σ and Σ OR Protocols
Σ-protocols are very useful cryptographic tools that are 3-round public-coin protocols satisfying a special honest-verifier zero-knowledge (SHVZK) property and a special soundness property in the sense of knowledge extraction. Definition 2.8 (Σ-protocol [14] ) A 3-round public-coin protocol P, V is said to be a Σ-protocol for an N P-language with relation R L if the following hold:
• Completeness. If P , V follow the protocol, the verifier always accepts.
• Special soundness. From any common input x of length poly(n) and any pair of accepting conversations on input x, (a, e, z) and (a, e ′ , z ′ ) where e = e ′ , one can efficiently compute w such that (x, w) ∈ R L . Here a, e, z stand for the first, the second and the third message respectively and e is assumed to be a string of length k (such that 1 k is polynomially related to the security parameter 1 n ) selected uniformly at random in {0, 1} k .
• Special honest verifier zero-knowledge (SHVZK). There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) simulator S, which on input x (where there exists a w such that (x, w) ∈ R L ) and a random challenge stringê, outputs an accepting conversation of the form (â,ê,ẑ), with the probability distribution that is indistinguishable from that of the real conversation (a, e, z) between the honest P (w) and V on input x.
A Σ-protocol is called perfect/statistical Σ-protocol, if it is perfect/statistical SHVZK. A Σ-protocol is called partial witness-independent, if the generation of its first-round message is independent of (i.e., without using) the witness for the common input. A very large number of Σ-protocols have been developed in the literature. In particular, (the n-parallel repetition of) Blum's protocol for DHC [9] is a (partial witness-independent) computational Σ-protocol for N P; That is, the n-parallel repetition of Blum's protocol for DHC [9] is also a three-round (partial witness-independent) WI for N P. Most practical Σ-protocols for number-theoretical languages (e.g., DLP and RSA [68, 44] , etc) are (partial witness-independent) perfect Σ-protocols. For a good survey of Σ-protocols and their applications, the reader is referred to [18] .
Σ-Protocol for DLP [68] . The following is a Σ-protocol P, V proposed by Schnorr [68] for proving the knowledge of discrete logarithm, w, for a common input of the form (p, q, g, h) such that h = g w mod p, where on a security parameter n, p is a uniformly selected n-bit prime such that q = (p − 1)/2 is also a prime, g is an element in Z * p of order q. It is also actually the first efficient Σ-protocol proposed in the literature.
• P chooses r at random in Z q and sends a = g r mod p to V .
• V chooses a challenge e at random in Z 2 k and sends it to P . Here, k is fixed such that 2 k < q.
• P sends z = r + ew mod q to V , who checks that g z = ah e mod p, that p, q are prime and that g, h have order q, and accepts iff this is the case.
The OR-proof of Σ-protocols [15] . One basic construction with Σ-protocols is the OR of a real protocol conversation and a simulated one, called Σ OR , that allows a prover to show that given two inputs x 0 , x 1 (for possibly different N P-relations R 0 and R 1 respectively), it knows a w such that either (x 0 , w) ∈ R 0 or (x 1 , w) ∈ R 1 , but without revealing which is the case (i.e., witness indistinguishable WI) [15] . Specifically, given two Σ-protocols P b , V b for R b , b ∈ {0, 1}, with random challenges of, without loss of generality, the same length k, consider the following protocol P, V , which we call Σ OR . The common input of P, V is (x 0 , x 1 ) and P has a private input w such that (x b , w) ∈ R b .
• P computes the first message a b in P b , V b , using x b , w as private inputs. P chooses e 1−b at random, runs the SHVZK simulator of P 1−b , V 1−b on input (x 1−b , e 1−b ), and lets (a 1−b , e 1−b , z 1−b ) be the output. P finally sends a 0 , a 1 to V .
• V chooses a random k-bit string s and sends it to P .
• P sets e b = s ⊕ e 1−b and computes the answer z b to challenge e b using (x b , a b , e b , w) as input. He sends (e 0 , z 0 , e 1 , z 1 ) to V .
• V checks that s = e 0 ⊕ e 1 and that conversations (a 0 , e 0 , z o ), (a 1 , e 1 , z 1 ) are accepting conversations with respect to inputs x 0 , x 1 , respectively. The SHVZK simulator of Σ OR [15] . For a Σ OR -protocol of the above form, denote by S OR the perfect SHVZK simulator of it and denote by S b the perfect SHVZK simulator of the protocol P b , V b for b ∈ {0, 1}. Then on common input (x 0 , x 1 ) and a random stringê of length k, S OR ((x 0 , x 1 ),ê) works as follows: It firstly chooses a random k-bit stringê 0 , computesê 1 
The BPK Model with Adaptive Language Selection
We present the definitions of concurrent soundness and concurrent zero-knowledge in the BPK model (cf. [11, 59, 24, 63] ). The key augmentation with the current formulation, in comparison with previous definition of the BPK model, is to allow adaptive language selection based on public-keys.
Honest players in the BPK model
We say a class of languages L is admissible to a protocol P, V if the protocol can work (or, be instantiated) for any language L ∈ L. Typically, L could be the set of all N P-languages (via N Preduction in case P, V can work for an N P-complete language) or the set of any languages admitting Σ-protocols (in this case P, V could be instantiated for any language in L efficiently without going through general N P-reductions). Let R KEY be an N P-relation validating the public-key and secretkey pair (P K, SK) generated by honest verifiers, i.e., R KEY (P K, SK) = 1 indicates that SK is a valid secret-key of P K. Then, a protocol P, V in the BPK model, w.r.t. some admissible language set L and some key-validating relation R KEY , consists of the following:
• F , a public-key file that is a polynomial-size collection of records (id, P K id ), where id is a string identifying a verifier and P K id is its (alleged) public-key. When verifier's IDs are implicitly specified from the context, for presentation simplicity we also just take F as a collection of public-keys in protocol specification and security analysis.
• M, a PPT language-selecting machine that on inputs (1 n , F ) outputs the description of an N P-relation R L for an N P-language L ∈ L. The output of M (i.e., the description of R L ) is then given to both the prover P and (proof-stage of) the verifier V . We require that given the description of R L , the admissibility of L (i.e., the membership of L ∈ L) can be efficiently decided.
• P (1 n , R L , x, w, F, id, γ), an honest prover that is a polynomial-time interactive machine, where 1 n is a security parameter, x is a poly(n)-bit string in L, w is an auxiliary input, F is a public-file, id is a verifier identity, and γ is its random-tape.
• V , an honest verifier that is a polynomial-time interactive machine working in two stages.
1. Key generation stage. V , on a security parameter 1 n and a random-tape r, outputs a key pair (P K, SK) satisfying R KEY (P K, SK) = 1. V then registers P K in F as its public-key while keeping the corresponding secret key SK in secret.
2. Proof stage. V , on inputs SK and R L , x ∈ {0, 1} poly(n) (which is supposed to be in L) and a random tape ρ, performs an interactive protocol with a prover and outputs "accept" indicating x ∈ L or "reject" indicating x ∈ L.
Note: On the one hand, augmenting the BPK model with adaptive language selection complicates the formulation and may be more difficult to fulfill against adversaries with adaptive language selection ability; but on the other hand, this is a far more realistic model for cryptographic protocols running concurrently in the public-key model, where mixing the public-key structure as part of the language is a natural adversarial strategy.
The malicious concurrent prover and concurrent soundness in the BPK model
An s-concurrent malicious prover P * in the BPK model, for a positive polynomial s, is a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine that, on a security parameter 1 n and an auxiliary string z ∈ {0, 1} * , performs an s-concurrent attack against V as follows in two stages: Let (P K, SK) be the output of the key generation stage of V on a security parameter 1 n and a random string r. Then, in the first stage, on inputs (1 n , P K, z) P * first generates (R L , τ ), where R L determines an admissible N P-language L ∈ L and τ ∈ {0, 1} * is some auxiliary information to be used in the second stage. We assume P * always selects an admissible language L in the first stage, otherwise the honest verifier will not start its proof stages as we assume the admissibility of L can be efficiently verified. Then, in the second stage (i.e., proof stage) w.r.t. R L and P K, P * can perform concurrently at most s(n) interactive protocols (sessions) with (the proof stage of) V as follows: If P * is already running i − 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ s(n)) sessions, it can select on the fly a common input x i ∈ {0, 1} poly(n) (which may be equal to x j for 1 ≤ j < i) and initiate a new session with the proof stage of V (1 n , R L , x i , SK, ρ i ); P * can output a message for any running protocol, and always receive promptly the response from V (that is, P * controls at its wish the schedule of the messages being exchanged in all the concurrent sessions). We stress that in different sessions V uses independent random-tapes in its proof stage (that is, ρ 1 , · · · , ρ s(n) are independent random strings). We denote by view P * (1 n , z) the random variable describing the view of P * in this experiment, which includes its random tape, the auxiliary string z, all messages it receives including the public-key P K and all messages sent by V (1 n , R L , x i , SK, ρ i )'s in the s(n) proof-stages, 1 ≤ i ≤ s(n). For any (P K, SK) ∈ R KEY , we denote by view V (SK) P * (1 n , z, P K) the random variable describing the view of P * specific to P K, which includes its random tape, the auxiliary string z, the (specific) P K, and all messages it receives from
We then say a protocol P, V is concurrently sound in the BPK model w.r.t. some admissible language set L, if for any sufficiently large n, for any honest verifier V and all (except for a negligible fraction of) (P K, SK) outputted by the key-generation stage of V , for all positive polynomials s and all s-concurrent malicious prover P * and any string z ∈ {0, 1} * , for any admissible language L ∈ L and any string x ∈ L (of length of poly(n)), the probability that V outputs "accept x ∈ L" in the s-concurrent attack against V (1 n , R L , SK) (i.e., in one of the s(n) sessions) is negligible in n, where the probability is taken over the randomness of P * , the randomness of V for key-generations and for all the s(n) proof-stages.
Notes: The above concurrent soundness is defined w.r.t multiple proof-stages (sessions) with the same public-key. In this case, we can imagine that the auxiliary information z encodes information collected from protocol executions w.r.t. other public-keys that are generated independently of the public-key P K at hand. Note that, as discussed in [59] , extension to the general case, where P * interacts with instances of multiple verifiers with multiple (independently generated) public-keys, is direct. Also note that all proof-stages of V (i.e., all the s(n) sessions) are w.r.t. the same admissible language L. Such treatment is only for presentation simplicity. Both the security model and security proof of this work can be easily extended to the general case, where P * can select admissible language L i for each session i, 1 ≤ i ≤ s(n) (in this case, whenever P * starts a new session it sends (x i , R L i ) to V indicating that the new session is on common input x i and for admissible language L i ).
The malicious concurrent verifier and concurrent ZK in the BPK model
An s-concurrent malicious verifier V * , where s is a positive polynomial, is a PPT Turing machine that, on input 1 n and an auxiliary string z, works in two stages:
language L ∈ L, an arbitrary public-file F and a list of (without loss of generality) s(n)
Stage-2 (proof stage). Starting from the final configuration of Stage-1, V * concurrently interacts with s(n) 2 instances of the honest prover P :
's are independent random strings. In this stage, V * controls at its wish the schedule of the messages being exchanged in all the concurrent sessions. In particular, V * can output a message for any running session dynamically based on the transcript up to now, and always receive promptly the response from P . For any auxiliary string z ∈ {0, 1} * , each public-key file F and R L outputted by V * in Stage-1 and anyx
we denote by view
(1 n ,x) the random variable describing the view of V * in its second stage of this experiment, which includes (z, F, R L ,x), the randomness of V * in its second stage and all messages received from all the s(n) 2 prover instances.
Definition 3.1 (concurrent zero-knowledge in the BPK model) A protocol P, V is (blackbox) concurrent zero-knowledge in the BPK model w.r.t. some admissible language set L, if there exists a PPT black-box simulator S such that for any sufficiently large n and every s-concurrent malicious verifier V * the following two distribution ensembles are indistinguishable:
Notes: For presentation simplicity, the CZK property in the BPK model with adaptive language selection is formulated with respect to that all s(n) 2 sessions (i.e., proof-stages) are for the same N Prelation R L and thatx ∈ L s(n) are predefined (i.e., not selected adaptively by V * ). Both the security model and security proof of this work can be easily extended to the general cases, where V * can select admissible language for each of the s(n) 2 sessions and can select the common inputs x i 's adaptively. We remark that for adaptive input selection, it is the responsibility of V * to provide the corresponding N P-witnesses w i 's to the honest prover instances.
Motivation for Concurrent Knowledge-Extraction in the PublicKey Model
We show a concurrent interleaving and malleating attack on the concurrent ZK protocol of [24] that is both concurrently sound and normal argument of knowledge in the BPK model, in which by concurrently interacting with the honest verifier in two sessions a malicious P * can (with probability 1) malleate the verifier's interactions in one session into successful interactions in another session on a true (public-key related) statement but without knowing any witness to the statement being proved. This shows that concurrent soundness and normal arguments of knowledge do not guarantee concurrent verifier security in the public-key model. Actually, we show that, assuming any OWF, CKE is strictly stronger than concurrent soundness in the public-key model. This serves a good motivation for understanding "possession of knowledge on the Internet with registered public-keys", i.e., the subtleties of concurrent knowledge-extraction in the public-key model.
The Protocol Structure of [24]
Key-generation. Let f V be a OWF that admits Σ-protocols. On a security parameter n, each verifier V randomly selects two elements in the domain of f V , x 0 V and x 1 V of length n each,
as its public-key while keeping x b V as its secret-key for a randomly chosen b from {0, 1}. (For OWF-based implementation, V also publishes a random string r V of length 3n that serves the first-round message of Naor's OWF-based perfectly-binding commitment scheme [60] .)
Common input. An element x ∈ L of length poly(n), where L is an N P-language that admits Σ-protocols.
The main-body of the protocol. The main-body of the protocol consists of the following three phases:
Phase-1. The verifier V proves to P that it knows the preimage of either y 0 V or y 1 V , by executing the Σ OR -protocol on (y 0 V , y 1 V ) in which V plays the role of the knowledge prover. It is additionally required that the first-round message of the Σ OR -protocol is generated without using the preimage of either y 0 V or y 1 V (i.e., partial witness-independent). Denote by a V , e V , z V , the first-round, the second-round and the third-round message of the Σ ORprotocol of this phase respectively. Here e V is the random challenge sent by the prover to the verifier. (For OWF-based implementation, P sends a random string r P of length 3n on the top, which serves the first-round message of Naor's OWF-based perfectly-binding commitments and is used by V in generating a V .) If V successfully finishes the Σ OR -protocol of this phase and P accepts, then goto Phase-2. Otherwise, P aborts.
Phase-2. Let T C be a trapdoor bit commitment scheme with the preimage of either y 0 V or y 1 V as the trapdoor. The prover randomly selects a stringê ∈ {0, 1} n , and sends cê = {T CCom(ê 1 ), T CCom(ê 2 ), · · · , T CCom(ê n )} to the verifier V , whereê i is the i-th bit ofê.
Phase-3. Phase-3 runs essentially the underlying Σ-protocol for L but with the random challenge set by a coin-tossing mechanism. Specifically, the prover computes and sends the first-round message of the underlying Σ-protocol, denoted a P , to the verifier V (for OWFbased implementation, a P is computed also using r V published by V in the key-generation phase); Then V responds with a random challenge q; Finally, P revealsê (committed in Phase-2), sets e P =ê ⊕ q, and computes the third-round message of the underlying Σ-protocol for L, denoted z P , with e P as the real random challenge.
Verifier's decision. V accepts if and only ifê is decommitted correctly and e P =ê ⊕ q and (a P , e P , z P ) is an accepting conversation for x ∈ L.
Remark: The above protocol structure is essentially that of the incomplete CZK protocol of [76] (Figure-3 , page 17), and can be implemented based on any OWF. The key difference in the actual implementations of [76, 24] is that [24] uses a special trapdoor commitment scheme in Phase-2, where the decommitment formation to 0 or 1 is in turn committed in two statistically-binding commitments. This technique is critical for achieving concurrent soundness, the reader is referred to [24] for more details. We remark that the differences in actual implementations do not invalidate the attack presented below in Section 4.2, which is presented with respect to a more general protocol structure.
The concurrent interleaving and malleating attack
With respect to the above protocol structure of the protocols of [24, 76] , letL be any N P-language admitting a Σ-protocol that is denoted by ΣL (in particular,L can be an empty set). Then for an honest verifier V with its public-key
Note that for any stringx (whetherx ∈L or not), the state-
is honestly generated. Also note that L is a language that admits Σ-protocols (as Σ OR -protocol is itself a Σ-protocol). Now, we describe the concurrent interleaving and malleating attack, in which P * successfully convinces the honest verifier of the statement "(x, y 0 V , y 1 V ) ∈ L" for any arbitrary poly(n)-bit stringx (even whenx ∈L) by concurrently interacting with V in two sessions as follows.
1. P * initiates the first session with V . (For OWF-based implementation, P just sends r P = r V as its first message to V , where r V is the random string registered by V as a part of its public-key for OWF-based implementation.) After receiving the first-round message, denoted by a ′ V , of the Σ OR -protocol of Phase-1 of the first session on common input (y 0 V , y 1 V ) (i.e., V 's public-key), P * suspends the first session.
2. P * initiates a second session with V , and works just as the honest prover does in Phase-1 and Phase-2 of the second session. We denote by cê the Phase-2 message of the second session (i.e., cê commits to a random stringê of length n). When P * moves into Phase-3 of the second session and needs to send V the first-round message, denoted by a P , of the Σ-protocol of Phase-3 of the second session on common input (x, y 0 V , y 1 V ), P * does the following:
• P * first runs the SHVZK simulator of ΣL (i.e., the Σ-protocol forL) onx to get a simulated conversation, denoted by (ax, ex, zx), for the (possibly false) statement "x ∈L".
• P * sets a P = (ax, a ′ V ) and sends a P to V as the first-round message of the Σ-protocol of Phase-3 of the second session, where a ′ V is the one received by P * in the first session.
• After receiving the second-round message of Phase-3 of the second session, denoted by q (i.e., the random challenge from V ), P * sets e P =ê ⊕ q and then suspends the second session.
3. P * continues the first session, and sends e ′ V =ê ⊕ q ⊕ ex = e P ⊕ ex as the second-round message of the Σ OR -protocol of Phase-1 of the first session.
4. After receiving the third-round message of the Σ OR -protocol of Phase-1 of the first session, denoted by z ′ V , P * suspends the first session again.
5. P * continues the execution of the second session again, revealsê committed in Phase-2 of the second session, and sends to V z P = ((ex, zx), (e ′ V , z ′ V )) and the decommitment information of e as the last-round message of the second session.
Note that (ax, ex, zx) is an accepting conversation for the (possibly false) statement "x ∈L",
is an accepting conversation for showing the knowledge of the preimage of either y 0 V or y 1 V , and furthermore ex ⊕ e ′ V = e P =ê ⊕ q. According to the description of Σ OR (presented in Section 2), this means that, from the viewpoint of V , (a P , e P , z P ) is an accepting conversation of Phase-3 of the second-session on common input (x, y 0 V , y 1 V ). That is, P * successfully convinced V of the statement "(x, (y 0 V , y 1 V )) ∈ L" (even forx ∈L) in the second session but without knowing any corresponding N P-witness! This demonstrates that the protocol of [24] fails to be a proof of knowledge (fails knowledge extraction) in concurrent executions (note that it was not designed as such, since this new issue is the notion we put forth here). We remark that mixing the public key structure as part of the language is a natural attack strategy for the public-key model (a different demonstration of this was given in [75] ).
Formulating Concurrent Knowledge-Extraction in the PublicKey Model
Now, we proceed to formulate concurrent verifier security in light of the above concrete attack against the protocol of [76, 24] . Note that the concrete attack is of man-in-the-middle (MIM) nature, and is related to malleability of protocols. The security notion assuring that a malicious prover P * does "know" what it claims to know, when it is concurrently interacting with the honest verifier V , can informally be formulated as: for any x, if P * can convince V (with public-key P K) of "x ∈ L" (for an N P-language L) by concurrent interactions, then there exists a PPT knowledge-extractor that outputs a witness for x ∈ L. This is a natural extension of the normal arguments of knowledge into the concurrent settings in the public-key model. However, such a definition does not work in the public-key model. The reason is: the statements being proved may be related to P K, and thus the extracted witness may be related to its corresponding secret-key SK (actually, for the malicious prover strategy of the concrete attack on the protocol of [76, 24] , the extracted witness will just be the same secret-key used by the knowledge-extractor); But, in knowledge-extraction the PPT extractor may have already possessed SK. To solve this subtlety, we require the extracted witness, together with adversary's view, to be independent of SK. But, the problem here is how to formalize such independence, in particular, w.r.t. a concurrent MIM? We solve this in the spirit of non-malleability formulation [26] . That is, we consider the message space (distribution) of SK, and such independence is roughly formulated as follows: let SK be the secret-key and SK ′ is an element randomly and independently distributed over the space of SK, then we require that, for any polynomial-time computable relation R, the probability Pr[R(w, SK, view) = 1] is negligibly close to Pr[R(w, SK ′ , view) = 1], wherew is the set of witnesses extracted by the knowledge extractor for successful concurrent sessions and view is the view of the adversary P * . This captures the intuition that P * does, in fact, "know" the witnesses to the statements whose validations are successfully conveyed by concurrent interactions. • Simulatability. The following ensembles are identical (or indistinguishable): Section 2) . This in particular implies that str includes (P K, z), and the probability ensembles {S 1 (1 n , z)} z∈{0,1} * and {P * (1 n , z)} z∈{0,1} * (defined in Section 2) are actually identical (or indistinguishable).
• Secret-key independent knowledge-extraction. E, on inputs (1 n , str, sta), outputs witnesses to all statements successfully proved in accepting sessions in str. Specifically, E outputs a list of strings w = (w 1 , w 2 , · · · , w s(n) ), satisfying the following:
-w i is set to be ⊥, if the i-th session in str is not accepting (due to abortion or verifier verification failure), where 1 ≤ i ≤ s(n).
-Correct knowledge-extraction for (individual) statements: In any other cases (i.e., for successful sessions), with overwhelming probability
, where x i is the common input selected by P * for the i-th session in str and R L is the admissible N P-relation for L ∈ L set by P * in str.
The simulator S = (S KEY , S P ROOF ):
, where the distribution of (P K, SK) is identical with that of the output of the key-generation stage of the honest verifier V , R KEY (P K, SK) = R KEY (P K, SK ′ ) = 1 and the distributions of SK and SK are identical and independent. In other words, SK and SK ′ are two random and independent secret-keys corresponding to P K.
. That is, on inputs (1 n , P K, SK, z) and with oracle access to P * (1 n , P K, z), the simulator S outputs a simulated transcript str, and some state information sta to be transformed to the knowledge-extractor E.
We denote by S 1 (1 n , z) the random variable str (in accordance with above processes of S KEY and S P ROOF ). For any (P K, SK) ∈ R KEY and any z ∈ {0, 1} * , we denote by S 1 (1 n , P K, SK, z) the random variable describing the first output of S P * (1 n , P K, z) P ROOF
(1 n , P K, SK, z) (i.e., str specific to (P K, SK)).
The knowledge-extractor E: w ←− E(1 n , sta, str). On (sta, str), E outputs a list of witnesses to statements whose validations are successfully conveyed in str.
-(Joint) knowledge extraction independence (KEI):
The probabilities are taken over the randomness of S in the key-generation stage (i.e., the randomness for generating (P K, SK, SK ′ )) and in all proof stages, the randomness of E, and the randomness of P * . If the KEI property holds for any (not necessarily polynomial-time computable) relation R, we say the protocol P, V satisfies statistical CKE and statistical KEI.
Discussion and justification of the CKE formulation
We first note that the above CKE formulation follows the simulation-extraction approach of [67] (which is also used in [4] ). Here, the key augmentation, besides some other adaptations in the publickey model, is the property of knowledge-extraction independence (KEI) explicitly required. Though the CKE and KEI notions are formulated in the framework of public-key model, they are actually applicable to protocols in the plain model, in general, in order to capture knowledge extractability against concurrent adversaries interacting with honest players of secret values. Simulated public-keys vs. real public-keys. In our CKE formulation, the simulationextraction is w.r.t. simulated public-keys. In this case, explicitly requiring the KEI property is crucial for correctly formulating CKE, as the simulator/extractor possesses the secret-keys corresponding to the simulated public-keys. A natural and intuitive strengthening of the CKE formulation might be: the simulator/extractor uses the same public-keys of the honest verifiers. Specifically, for any concurrent malicious P * there exists a PPT simulator/extractor that, on the same public-key of the honest verifier, outputs a simulated transcript (that is indistinguishable from the real view of P * ) together with all witnesses to accepting sessions. In this case, as the simulator/extractor does not possesses the secret-key (of the honest verifier), the KEI property can be waived. But, the key observation here is: constant-round CKE (whether ZK or not) with real public-keys are impossible. Specifically, constant-round CKE with real public-keys implies constant-round CZK (actually, potentially concurrently non-malleable ZK proof of knowledge) in the plain model by viewing verifier's public-keys as a part of common inputs, which is however impossible at least in the black-box sense [12] .
On the non-triviality of KEI even with independent languages. With the above CKE formulation, we are actually formulating the independence of the witnesses, used ("known") by concurrent MIM adversary, on the secret-key (witness) used by verifier (who may in turn play the role of prover in some sub-protocols). A naive solution for KEI, which appears to make sense in certain scenarios, may be to require the language and statements being proved are independent of verifier's public-keys. But, this way does not work in general. Firstly note that, if the protocol is for N P-Complete, the statements being proved, selected adaptively by the adversary, can be always related to verifier's public-key (e.g., via N P-reductions); Moreover, for protocols in the BPK model, verifier's keys are used in essential ways, particularly in order to achieve round efficiency. This is the case, especially when the protocol in the public-key model runs concurrently over Internet (note that most concurrently secure cryptographic tasks cannot be implemented round-efficiently in the plain model). Typically, a constant-round cryptographic protocol in the BPK model consists of several sub-protocols, such that the common statement and verifier's public-keys are mixed into the inputs to some sub-protocols. In this case, even if the language (and even if the witness being used by the honest prover) is independent of verifier's public-keys, the inputs to the sub-protocols, selected and decided by the concurrent adversary based on its view of concurrent interleaving attacks, can be always related to (dependent on) verifier's keys (a typical illustration is the Feige-Shamir-ZK-like protocols in the public-key model [30] ). The various concurrent interleaving and malleating attacks presented in this work (in particular, the attack against the protocol variant of the efficient CZK-CKE without c sk in Section 7.3.2) just demonstrate such cases.
CKE vs. concurrent soundness. We show that, assuming any OWF, CKE is a strictly stronger notion for concurrent verifier security than concurrent soundness in the public-key model.
Proposition 5.1 Assuming any OWF, CKE is strictly stronger than concurrent soundness in the public-key model.
Proof. (of Proposition 5.1) It's easy to see that CKE implies concurrent soundness in the publickey model. Specifically, suppose that for some (P K, SK) ∈ R KEY , some admissible language L and some string x ∈ L P * can convince V (R L , SK) of the false statement "x ∈ L" with non-negligible probability in real execution, then with almost the same probability (up to a negligible gap) P * can convince the simulator S(R L , SK) of x ∈ L in Expt CKE (1 n , z) by the property of simulatability, which however contradicts the secret-key independent knowledge-extraction property.
Then the proposition is direct from the attack demonstrated in Section 4.2 on the CZK protocol of [24] that is both concurrently sound and normal argument of knowledge and can be implemented based on any OWF. Specifically, for the specific strategy of P * of the concurrent interleaving and malleating attack, supposex ∈L or justL is empty, the witness extracted by any polynomialtime knowledge-extraction algorithm E (with SK = x b V as its input) must be the preimage of either y 0 V or y 1 V . But, according to the one-wayness of f V used in the key-generation stage, with overwhelming probability the extracted witness will be the preimage of y b V conditioned on E outputs a witness. (Specifically, consider the simulator/extractor emulates the key-generation of the honest verifier, except that the value y 1−b V is received externally as its input.) Define the relation R as: R(w, SK, ·) = 1 if f V (w) = f V (SK). Then, conditioned on E outputs a witness, the extracted witness (i.e., the preimage of y b V ) is always related to SK = x b V , but can be related to a random and independent SK ′ with negligible probability. Thus, the CZK protocol of [24] is not concurrently knowledge-extractable in the public-key model.
Generic CZK-CKE in the BPK Model
In this section, we present the generic constant-round CZK-CKE arguments for N P in the BPK model under standard hardness assumptions. The starting point is the basic and famous Feige-Shamir ZK (FSZK) structure [30] . The FSZK structure is conceptually simple, which simply composes two WIPOK sub-protocols. In more details, let f be a OWF, in the first WIPOK sub-protocol with the verifier V serving as the knowledge-prover, V computes (y 0 = f (s 0 ), y 1 = f (s 1 )) for randomly chosen s 0 and s 1 ; then V proves to the prover P the knowledge of the preimage of either y 0 or y 1 . In the second WIPOK sub-protocol with P serving as the knowledge-prover, on common input x, P proves to V the knowledge of either a valid N P-witness w for x ∈ L or the preimage of either y 0 or y 1 . FSZK is also argument of knowledge, and can be high practically instantiated (without going through general N P-reductions) by the Σ OR technique [15] .
Let (y 0 , y 1 ) serve as the public-key of V and s b (for a random bit b) as the secret-key, the publickey version of FSZK is CZK in the BPK model. But, we shew that the public-key version of FSZK is not concurrently sound [75] , needless to say concurrent knowledge-extractability (indeed, FSZK was not designed for the public-key model). We hope to add the CKE property to FSZK in the BPK model (and thus get concurrent security both for the prover and for the verifier simultaneously), while remaining its conceptual simple structure as well as the ability of practical instantiations.
The subtle point here is: we are actually facing (dealing with) a concurrent MIM (CMIM), who manages to malleate, in a malicious and unpredictable way, the public-keys and knowledge-proof interactions of the verifier in one session into the statements and knowledge-proof interactions in another concurrent session. To add CKE security to FSZK in the BPK model, some non-malleable (maybe inefficient) building tools seem to be intrinsically required. In this work, we show how to do so without employing any non-malleable building tools.
The idea is to strengthen the first sub-protocol to be statistical WIPOK, and require the prover to first commit, before starting the second WI sub-protocol, the supposed witness to c w by running a statistically-binding commitment scheme C. This guarantees that if the witness committed to c w is dependent on the secret-key used by V , there are indeed some differences between the interaction distribution when V uses SK = s 0 and that when V uses SK = s 1 , and we can use such distribution differences to violate the statistical WI of the first sub-protocol. But, this solution loses CZK in general, as the second WI sub-protocol is run w.r.t. commitments to different values in real interactions and in the simulation. This problem can be got passed by using a stronger second subprotocol, i.e., the strong WI (SWI) [34] . Note that the composition of commitment and SWI is itself regular WI, and thus CZK property is salvaged.
The generic construction is depicted in Figure 1 , page 20 (as the generic construction is for N P via N P-reduction, we do not explicitly describe the language-selecting machine M in the protocol specification).
Security analysis
Notes on the underlying hardness assumptions and round-complexity. If the OWF f used in key-generation admits perfect/statistical Σ-protocols (and thus we can use Σ OR in Stage-1), and we use Feige-Shamir ZK (FSZK) of [31] (with WI is replaced by Σ OR ) to replace SWI of Stage-3, the protocol depicted in Figure 1 can be based on any OWF admitting perfect/statistical Σ-protocols, and be of optimal (i.e., 4-round) round-complexity by round combinations; If we use in Stage-1 the modified Blum's protocol for DHC with constant-round statistically/perfectly hiding commitments, the protocol depicted in Figure 1 can be based on any collision-resistant hash function or any claw-free collection with efficiently recognizable index set. Figure 1 is a constant-round concurrently knowledge-extractable concurrent ZK (CZK-CKE) argument for N P in the BPK model.
Theorem 6.1 The protocol depicted in
Proof. The completeness of the protocol P, V can be easily checked. Concurrent zero-knowledge. We first consider a mental simulator M that takes as input all secret-keys corresponding to all public-keys registered in the public-key file, in case the corresponding secret-keys exist.
n → {0, 1} n be any OWF, where 1 n is the system security parameter. Each verifier V selects random strings s 0 , s 1 from {0, 1} n , randomly selects a bit b ← {0, 1}, computes y b = f (s b ) and sets y 1−b = f (s 1−b ). V registers P K = (y 0 , y 1 ) in a public file F as its public-key, and keeps SK = s b as its secret-key. Define R KEY = {((y 0 , y 1 ), s)
poly(n) , where L is an N P-Complete language with the corresponding N P-relation R L . P private input. An N P-witness w ∈ {0, 1} poly(n) for x ∈ L. Here, we assume w.l.o.g. that the witness for any x ∈ L ∩ {0, 1} poly(n) is of the same length poly(n).
Stage-1. V proves to P that it knows a preimage to one of y 0 , y 1 , by running a statistical WIA/POK protocol for N P, in which V plays the role of knowledge prover. The witness used by V in this stage is s b .
Stage-2. If V successfully finishes Stage-1, P does the following: it computes and sends c w = C(w, r w ), where C is a statistically-binding commitment scheme and r w is the randomness used for commitments.
Then, P proves to V that it knows a witness for (x, y 0 , y 1 , c w ) ∈ L ′ , by running a strong WI argument/proof of knowledge (WIA/POK) protocol for N P. For any s(n)-concurrent malicious verifier V * (defined in Section 3) and any N P-language L, M runs V * as a subroutine on inputsx = {x 1 , · · · , x s(n) } ∈ L s(n) (where x i might equal x j , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ s(n) and i = j), the public file F = {P K 1 , · · · , P K s(n) } and all assumed existing secret-keys. M works just as the honest prover does in Stage-1 of any session. In Stage-2 of any session on a common input x i and with respect to a public-key P K j (i.e., the i-th session w.r.t P K j , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ s(n)), M computes c
w ), where SK j is the secret-key corresponding to P K j for which we assume it exists and M knows. Then, on input (x i , P K j , c (i) w ) M runs the strong WI argumnet/proof of knowledge for N P in Stage-3 of the session with (SK j , r (i) w ) as its witness. Then, by a simple hybrid argument, the indistinguishability between the output of M and the view of V * in real concurrent interactions is direct from the regular WI of commit-then-SWI. Note that, as mentioned in Section 2, regular WI preserves under concurrent composition in this case.
Finally, to build a PPT simulator S from scratch, where S does not know any secret-keys corresponding to public-keys in the public file, we resort to the technique developed in [11] . Specifically, S works in s(n) + 1 phases. In each phase, S either successfully finishes the simulation, or "covers" a new public-key for which it has not known the corresponding secret-key up to now in case V * successfully finishes the Stage-1 interactions w.r.t. that public-key. Key coverage is guaranteed by the POK property of Stage-1 interactions. For more details, see [11, 53] .
(Statistical ) concurrent knowledge-extraction. According to the CKE formulation, for any s-concurrent malicious prover P * (defined in Section 2) we need to build two algorithms (S, E). The simulator S, on inputs (1 n , z), works as follows: It first perfectly emulates the key-generation stage of the honest verifier, getting P K = (y 0 , y 1 ) and SK = s b and SK ′ = s 1−b for a random bit b. Then, S runs P * on (1 n , P K, z) to get (R L , τ ), where R L indicates an N P-language for which the proof-stages will work and τ is some auxiliary information to be used by P * in proof-stages. In the proof stages, S perfectly emulates the honest verifier with the secret-key SK. Finally, whenever P * stops, S outputs the simulated transcript str, together with the state information sta set to be (P K, SK, SK ′ , z) and the random coins used by S. Note that the simulated transcript str is identical to the view of P * in real execution.
The knowledge-extraction process is similar to that of [67] . Note that we need to extract witnesses to all accepting sessions in str. Given (str, sta), the knowledge-extractor E iteratively extracts witness for each accepting session. Specifically, for any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ s(n), we denote by E i the experiment for the knowledge-extractor on the i-th session. E i emulates S with the fixed random coins included in sta, with the exception that the random coins to be used by the simulator (emulating the honest verifier) for Stage-3 (i.e., SWIA/POK) of the i-th session are no longer emulated internally, but received externally. The experiment E i amounts to the execution of the SWIA/POK between a stand-alone (deterministic) prover and an honest verifier on common input (x i , P K, c (i) w ), where c (i) w is the Stage-2 message sent by P * in the i-th session. Suppose the i-th session w.r.t. common input x i is accepting (note that otherwise we do not need to extract a witness and the witness is set to be "⊥"), by applying the stand-alone knowledge-extractor (for SWIA/POK) on E i , we can extract (w i , r i ) in expected polynomial-time.
Here, A subtle point needs to be further clarified. Denote by p the probability that E i successfully finishes the SWIA/POK on input (x i , c (i) w ), by applying the (stand-alone) knowledge-extractor on E i , we get that the expected running-time is: T (n) = p · q(n) p−κ(n) , where q(n) p−κ(n) is the running-time of the knowledge-extractor and κ(·) is the knowledge error function (see Definition 2.7). But, when p is negligible, as clarified in [53] , T (n) is not necessarily to be polynomial in n. The technique to deal with this issue is to apply the technique originally introduced in [36] (which is also deliberated in [53] ). More details about the technique of dealing with this subtlety are referred to [36, 53] . Now, we consider the value committed to c
w that is also efficiently extracted. There are three possibilities:
Case-1. c
Case-1 can occur only with negligible probability, due to the one-wayness of f . Specifically, consider that y 1−b is given to the simulator as input, rather than being emulated internally.
Case-2 can occur also with negligible probability, due to the statistical WI of Stage-1. Suppose Case-2 occurs with non-negligible probability (and we know Case-1 occurs with negligible probability), we can simply open c
w 's by brute-force to violate the statistical WI of Stage-1. By removing Case-1 and Case-2, we conclude now that for any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ s(n), if the i-th session in str is accepting w.r.t. common input x i selected by P * , then E will output a witness w i for x i ∈ L. To finish the proof, we need to further show that knowledge-extraction is independent of the secret-key used by the simulator/extractor (i.e., the joint KEI property). Specifically, we need to show that Pr[R(SK,w, str) = 1] is negligibly close to Pr[R(SK ′ ,w, str) = 1] for any polynomialtime computable relation R, wherew is the list of extracted witnesses (when the simulator/extractor uses SK as the witness in Stage-1 interactions in str) and SK ′ is the element (outputted by S in accordance with Expt CKE (1 n , z)) randomly and independently distributed over the space of SK. The joint KEI property is direct from the statistical WI of Stage-1. Specifically, as the extracted witnesses are well-defined by the statistically-binding c Suppose the KEI property does not hold, it implies that there exists a bit α ∈ {0, 1} such that the difference between Pr[R(s α ,w, str) = 1|S/E uses s 0 in Stage-1 interactions in str] and Pr[R(s α ,w, str) = 1|S/E uses s 1 in Stage-1 interactions in str] is non-negligible. Now, we can incorporate the (s α , R) into a brute-force algorithm in order to break the statistical WI of Stage-1. Further details are omitted here. Note that the KEI property holds against any (not necessarily polynomial-time computable) relation R. That is, the protocol depicted in Figure 1 is of statistical CKE.
On the essential role of Strong WI
We remark that, with respect to the above generic CZK-CKE implementation depicted in Figure 1 , the SWI at Stage-3 plays an essential role for achieving CZK and CKE properties simultaneously. In particular, we note that regular WI is insufficient here. On the one hand, we do not know how to prove the CZK property in general, when SWI is replaced by a regular WI; On the other hand, as ZK is itself SWI, one may consider to use a special ZK (e.g., the FSZK which composes two regular WI sub-protocols) to replace SWI of Stage-3 such that the special ZK can share the regular WI of Stage-1 in the public-key model, and thus we only use regular WIPOK at Stage-3. This in particular implies a round-optimal (i.e., four-round) implementation by according round combinations. But, such solution loses the CKE property and even concurrent soundness in general in the public-key model (see the concrete attack to FSZK in the public-key model [75] ). That is, in the security analysis of the SWI-based generic CZK-CKE implementation, we will rely on the argument/proof of knowledge of SWI in the plain model that is not affected by concurrent composition in the plain model. If we replace the SWI by a ZK protocol in the BPK model, then we may require the ZK protocol has already been CKE-secure, which however is our goal here.
Still, in next section, we consider more efficient CZK-CKE implementations based on regular WI. But the situation with such solutions turns out to be much subtler.
Efficient CZK-CKE in the BPK Model
In this section, we present the efficient constant-round CZK-CKE arguments for N P in the BPK model, and the practical instantiations. The efficient CZK-CKE protocols rely on some minor complexity leveraging, in a novel way, to frustrate potential concurrent MIM. Along the way, we discuss and clarify the various subtleties.
Recall that for the generic CZK-CKE implementation presented in Section 6, the strong WI at Stage-3 plays an essential role for the provable security. But, employing strong WI complicates the protocol structure, and incurs protocol inefficiency. It would be desirable to still use regular WI at Stage-3, for conceptual simple protocol structure as well as for protocol efficiency. To bypass the subtleties of SWI for the CZK proof, we employ a double-commitments technique. Specifically, we require the prover to produce a double of statistically-binding commitments, c w and c sk , before starting the second WI sub-protocol, where c w is supposed to commit to a valid N P-witness for x ∈ L and c sk is supposed to commit to the preimage of either y 0 or y 1 . Double commitments can bypass, by hybrid arguments, the subtleties of SWI for the CZK proof. But, the provable CKE property with double commitments turns out to be much subtler, and we have to employ (some minimal) complexity leveraging, in a novel way, to frustrate potential CMIM adversarial strategies. This renders us an efficient, as well as conceptually simple, CZK-CKE solution, which can be further high practically instantiated for some number-theoretic languages.
The generic construction is depicted in Figure 2 , page 23 (as the construction is for N P via N P-reduction, we do not explicitly describe the language-selecting machine M in the protocol specification).
Note on efficiency. Though we employ double commitments at Stage-2, the strong WIA/POK of Stage-3 in the generic construction is replaced by any regular WIA/POK here, from which we can gain much better efficiency advantage. In particular, as we shall see, the efficient construction can be high practically instantiated. It's also easy to see that the implementation can be round-optimal by round combinations.
Notes on the complexity leveraging. We remark that complexity leveraging via the subexponential hardness assumption on verifier's public-key is only for provable security analysis to Key Generation. Let f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be any OWF secure against 2 n c -time adversaries for some constant c, 0 < c < 1, where 1 n is the system security parameter. Each verifier V selects random strings s 0 , s 1 from {0, 1}
n , randomly selects a bit b ← {0, 1}, computes y b = f (s b ) and sets y 1−b = f (s 1−b ). V registers P K = (y 0 , y 1 ) in a public file F as its public-key, and keeps SK = s b as its secret-key. Define
poly(n) . Denote by R L the corresponding N P-relation for L.
P private input. An N P-witness w ∈ {0, 1} poly(n) for x ∈ L. Here, we assume w.l.o.g. that the witness for any x ∈ L ∩ {0, 1} poly(n) is of the same length poly(n). Complexity leveraging. The system parameter is n, but the statistically-binding commitment c sk is generated on a relatively smaller security parameter n sk . Specifically, suppose the one-wayness of verifier's public-key holds against 2 n c -time adversaries for some constant c, 0 < c < 1. Let λ be any constant such that λ > 1 c , then we set n = n λ sk . Note that n and n sk are still polynomially related. That is, any quantity that is a polynomial of n is also another polynomial of n sk . This complexity leveraging guarantees that although a poly(n) · 2 n sk -time adversary can break the hiding property of c sk on a security parameter n sk , it is still infeasible to break the one-wayness of f (because poly(n) · 2 n sk ≪ 2 n c ).
Stage-1. V proves to P that it knows a preimage to one of y 0 , y 1 , by running a statistical WIA/POK protocol, in which V plays the role of knowledge prover. The witness used by V in this stage is s b .
Stage-2. If V successfully finishes Stage-1, P does the following: it computes and sends c w = C(w, r w ) and c sk = C(0 n , r sk ), where C is a statistically-binding commitment scheme and r w and r sk are the randomness used for commitments. c sk is generated on the smaller security parameter n sk specified above.
Then, P proves to V that it knows a witness for (x, y 0 , y 1 , c w , c sk ) ∈ L ′ , by running a (3-round) WI argument/proof of knowledge (WIA/POK) protocol for N P (e.g., the n-parallel repetition of Blum's protocol for DHC). The efficient CZK-CKE argument P, V for N P in the BPK model frustrate concurrent MIM. Both CZK simulation and CKE knowledge-extraction are still polynomialtime. We note that the use of complexity leveraging for frustrating concurrent MIM could be a novel paradigm, different from the uses of complexity leveraging in existing works for protocols in the BPK model (e.g., [11] ). Such paradigm can also be applied to other scenarios to frustrate potential concurrent MIM, while still providing polynomial-time simulation and/or knowledge-extraction. Note also that the complexity leveraging is minimal: it only applies to c sk and all other components of the protocol work on the general system parameter n; also, all components except for verifier's public-keys can be standard polynomially secure. Furthermore, as we shall see, the complexity leveraging can be waived as long as only concurrent soundness is concerned. We remark that though non-standard, sub-exponential hardness assumption may still be viewed to be reasonable, which is also used in a large body of works for fulfilling various cryptographic tasks. Detailed discussions and clarifications of the use of complexity leveraging for frustrating concurrent MIM can be found in Section 7.2.
On the necessity of double commitments c w and c sk . We stress that in the context of the above protocol structure of efficient CZK-CKE, mandating double commitments c w and c sk of Stage-2 plays a very crucial role for simultaneously achieving CZK and CKE in the public-key model. On the one hand, for protocol variants without either c w or c sk , concrete attacks exist, showing that they are not concurrently knowledge-extractable. Details are presented in Section 7.3; On the other hand, double commitments enable us to bypass the need of strong WI of Stage-3 for correct CZK simulation. Specifically, by employing double commitments the CZK simulation is not based on the strong WI property of Stage-3, and it is shown that regular WI is sufficient for correct CZK simulation by hybrid arguments.
Notes on the underlying hardness assumptions and round-complexity. First note that except for subexponential hardness assumption on the OWF f used in key generation, all other components in our solution can be standard polynomially secure. We note that if the OWF f admits perfect/statistical Σ-protocols (and thus we can use Σ OR in Stage-1), the protocol depicted in Figure  2 can be based on any sub-exponentially strong OWF admitting perfect/statistical Σ-protocols, and be of optimal (i.e., 4-round) round-complexity by round combinations; If we use in Stage-1 the modified Blum's protocol for DHC with constant-round statistically/perfectly hiding commitments, the protocol depicted in Figure 2 can be based on any collision-resistant hash function and any sub-exponentially strong OWF with optimal round-complexity, or based on any sub-exponentially strong claw-free collection (with efficiently recognizable index set) but with 5 rounds. In the later case (with modified Blum's protocol for DHC), we can use any sub-exponentially strong OWF for key generation. Figure 2 is concurrently knowledge-extractable concurrent ZK argument for N P in the BPK model.
Theorem 7.1 The protocol depicted in

Proof (sketch).
The completeness of the protocol P, V can be easily checked. Concurrent zero-knowledge. We first consider a mental simulator M that takes as input all secret-keys corresponding to all public-keys registered in the public-key file, in case the corresponding secret-keys exist.
For any s(n)-concurrent malicious verifier V * (defined in Section 3) and any N P-language L, M runs V * as a subroutine on inputsx = {x 1 , · · · , x s(n) } ∈ L s(n) (where x i might equal x j , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ s(n) and i = j), the public file F = {P K 1 , · · · , P K s(n) } and all assumed existing secret-keys. M works just as the honest prover does in Stage-1 of any session. In Stage-2 of any session on a common input x i and with respect to a public-key P K j (i.e., the i-th session w.r.t P K j , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ s(n)), M computes c
sk ), where SK j is the secret-key corresponding to P K j for which we assume it exists and M knows. Then, M runs the WIA/POK protocol with V * in Stage-3 of the session with (SK j , r (i) sk ) as its witness. To show the output of M is indistinguishable from the view of V * in real concurrent interactions, we consider another mental simulator M ′ . M ′ takes both the witnesses forx = {x 1 , · · · , x s(n) } and all the secret-keys corresponding to public-keys registered in F (in case the corresponding secret-keys exist). M ′ works just as M does, but with the following exception: for any i, j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ s(n), in Stage-2 of the i-th session on common input x i w.r.t P K j , M ′ computes c
, where w i is the witness for the common input x i . Note that the witness used by M ′ in Stage-3 is still SK j , just as M does. That the output of M ′ is indistinguishable from that of M is from the computational hiding property of the statistically-binding commitment scheme C used in Stage-2. Otherwise, by a simple hybrid argument, we can violate the hiding property of the underlying commitment scheme C.
We now consider another mental simulator M ′′ that mimics M ′ with the following exception: for any i, j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ s(n), in Stage-3 of the i-th session on common input x i w.r.t P K j , the witness used by M ′′ is w i , rather than SK j as used by M ′ . By hybrid arguments, the output of M ′′ is indistinguishable from that of M ′ by the WI property of Stage-3. Also, by hybrid arguments, the output of M ′′ is also indistinguishable from the view of V * in real concurrent interactions by the computational hiding property of the underlying commitment scheme C used in Stage-2.
This establishes that the output of M is indistinguishable from the view of V * in real concurrent interactions. To build a PPT simulator S from scratch, where S does not know any secret-keys corresponding to public-keys in the public file, we again resort to the technique developed in [11] . Specifically, S works in s(n)+1 phases. In each phase, S either successfully finishes the simulation, or "covers" a new public-key for which it has not known the corresponding secret-key up to now in case V * successfully finishes the Stage-1 interactions w.r.t. that public-key. Key covering is guaranteed by the POK property of Stage-1 interactions. For more details, see [11] .
(Statistical) concurrent knowledge-extraction. According to the CKE formulation, for any s-concurrent malicious prover P * (defined in Section 2) we need to build two algorithms (S, E). The simulator S, on inputs (1 n , z), works as follows: It first perfectly emulates the key-generation stage of the honest verifier, getting P K = (y 0 , y 1 ) and SK = s b and SK ′ = s 1−b for a random bit b. Then, S runs P * on (1 n , P K, z) to get (R L , τ ), where R L indicates an N P-language for which the proof-stages will work and τ is some auxiliary information to be used by P * in proof-stages. In the proof stages, S perfectly emulates the honest verifier with the secret-key SK. Finally, whenever P * stops, S outputs the simulated transcript str, together with the state information sta set to be (P K, SK, SK ′ , z) and the random coins used by S. Note that the simulated transcript str is identical to the view of P * in real execution.
The knowledge-extraction process is similar to that of [67] . Note that we need to extract witnesses to all accepting sessions in str. Given (str, sta), the knowledge-extractor E iteratively extracts witness for each accepting session. Specifically, for any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ s(n), we denote by E i the experiment for the knowledge-extractor on the i-th session. E i emulates S with the fixed random coins included in sta, with the exception that the random challenge (i.e., the second-round message) of the WIA/POK protocol of Stage-3 in the i-th session is no longer emulated internally, but received externally. The experiment E i amounts to the execution of the WIA/POK protocol of Stage-3 between a stand-alone (deterministic) prover and an honest verifier on common input x i . Suppose the i-th session w.r.t. common input x i is accepting (note that otherwise we do not need to extract a witness and the witness is set to be "⊥"), by applying the stand-alone knowledge-extractor (for the underlying WIA/POK) on E i , according to the POK property of the underlying WIA/POK protocol (say, the n-parallel repetition of Blum's protocol for DHC) except for the probability 2 −n we can extract (w i , r i ) in expected polynomial-time, satisfying one of the following:
Case-1. c Case-2. c
The subtle point here is: by applying the stand-alone knowledge-extractor on E i , the Stage-1 interactions given by the simulator/extractor would also be rewound, which could reveal the secretkey SK. In particular, recall the adversarial strategies presented in Section 4. Here, it is the critical combination of complexity leveraging on the statistically-binding commitment c sk and the statistical WI of Stage-1 that provably rules out such concurrent interleaving and malleating attacks.
Proposition 7.1 Case-2 occurs with negligible probability.
Proof (of Proposition 7.1). Suppose Case-2 occurs with non-negligible probability, this means that for some (s 0 , s 1 , b) , where s 0 , s 1 ∈ {0, 1} n and b ∈ {0, 1}, such that when the simulator S uses s b as the witness for simulating Stage-1 interactions, with non-negligible probability p(n), the c (i) sk in the simulated transcript str outputted by S is a commitment of s b . Otherwise, Case-2 will trivially occur with negligible probability. But, due to the statistical WI of Stage-1, with the same probability p(n) the c On the subtleties without the complexity leveraging. We remark that the uses of the complexity leveraging on c sk , along with statistical WI of Stage-1, not only provably rules out Case-2, but also greatly simplifies the proof of Proposition 7.1. In particular, we do not know how to provably prove Proposition 7.1 without the complexity leveraging. Detailed clarifications of the subtleties are presented in Section 7.2, which in particular implies that the efficient CZK-CKE protocol depicted in Figure 2 is concurrently sound under standard polynomial-time hardness assumptions.
By removing Case-1 and Case-2, we conclude now that for any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ s(n), if the i-th session in str is accepting w.r.t. common input x i selected by P * , then E will output a witness w i for x i ∈ L. To finish the proof, we need to further show that knowledge-extraction is independent of the secret-key used by the simulator/extractor (i.e., the joint KEI property). Specifically, we need to show that Pr[R(SK,w, str) = 1] is negligibly close to Pr[R(SK ′ ,w, str) = 1] for any polynomialtime computable relation R, wherew is the list of extracted witnesses (when the simulator/extractor uses SK as the witness in Stage-1 interactions in str) and SK ′ is the element (outputted by S in accordance with Expt CKE (1 n , z)) randomly and independently distributed over the space of SK. The joint KEI property is direct from the statistical WI of Stage-1. Specifically, as the extracted witnesses are well-defined by the statistically-binding c Suppose the KEI property does not hold, it implies that there exists a bit α ∈ {0, 1} such that the difference between Pr[R(s α ,w, str) = 1|S/E uses s 0 in Stage-1 interactions in str] and Pr[R(s α ,w, str) = 1|S/E uses s 1 in Stage-1 interactions in str] is non-negligible. Now, we can incorporate the (s α , R) into a brute-force algorithm in order to break the statistical WI of Stage-1. Further details are omitted here. Note that the KEI property holds against any (not necessarily polynomial-time computable) relation R, that is, the protocol depicted in Figure 2 is of statistical CKE.
On the subtleties without the complexity leveraging
In this section, we clarify the subtleties and justify the necessity of the (minimal) complexity leveraging on c sk with the efficient CZK-CKE. We first give high-level discussions on the use of complexity leveraging against (concurrent) men-in-the-middle; Then, we make in-depth clarifications by attempting to provide a proof of Proposition 7.1 without the complexity leveraging on c sk , which identifies the subtleties or difficulties that seemingly cannot be overcome without exploiting the complexity leveraging on c sk (and also the statistical WI of Stage-1).
On the use of complexity leveraging against man-in-the-middle
Recall that, for the generic CZK-CKE (depicted in Figure 1 ), to successfully finish the i-th session with commit-then-SWI mechanism, for any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ s(n), an s-concurrent adversary P * has to use the value committed to (determined by) the unique Stage-2 commitment c Adversarial-Strategy-2. With non-negligible probability p, P * commits s 0 (resp., s 1 ) to c s 1 ) as the witness, in case V uses s 0 (resp., s 1 ) as the witness in Stage-1 interactions; However, with the same probability p, P * commits both a valid witness w to c Note that the concurrent malicious prover P * actually amounts to a concurrent MIM who manages, by concurrent interleaving interactions, to malleate verifier's public-keys and Stage-1 interactions (in which it plays the role of the verifier) into successful Stage-2 and Stage-3 interactions (in which P * plays the role of the prover), but without knowing any witness for the Stage-2 and Stage-3 interactions. Note that both the above two cases indicate the failure of knowledge-extraction correctness: that is, with non-negligible probability, the value extracted (when using SK = s b for a random bit b) is the preimage of y 0 or y 1 committed to c (i) sk . But, no contradiction can be reached without resorting to the complexity leveraging. In particular, they do not violate the statistical WI of Stage-1: in the first case, the value committed to c (i) sk is fixed; and in the second case, with probability 2p, the value committed to c (i) sk is s b for both b ∈ {0, 1}, no matter which secret-key (whether s 0 or s 1 ) is used in Stage-1 interactions. As we do not employ any non-malleable building tools and we are actually facing a concurrent MIM P * , the above MIM adversarial strategies could indeed be potential. At least, we do not know how to provably rule out such seemingly impossible adversarial activities, without resorting to the complexity leveraging.
We note that the use of complexity leveraging for frustrating concurrent MIM could be a novel paradigm, different from the uses of complexity leveraging in existing works (e.g., [11, 74] ). Such paradigm may be possibly of independent interest, and can be applied in other scenarios to frustrate potential concurrent MIM, while still providing polynomial-time simulation and/or knowledgeextraction as well as remaining the protocol efficiency and conceptual simple protocol structure. Note also that the complexity leveraging is minimal: it only applies to c sk , and all components except for verifier's public-keys can be standard polynomially secure.
Analysis attempt without complexity leveraging
In this section, by attempting to provide a proof of Proposition 7.1 without the complexity leveraging on c sk , we clarify the subtleties or difficulties that seemingly cannot be overcome without exploiting the complexity leveraging on c sk (and also the statistical WI of Stage-1). The analysis in particular implies that the efficient CZK-CKE protocol depicted in Figure 2 is concurrently sound under standard polynomial-time hardness assumptions and that partial witness independent WI (employed in the works of [24, 20, 21] ) seems to be insufficient even for correct knowledge-extraction for individual statements. In the following security analysis, we assume no complexity leveraging on c sk , i.e., verifier's public-keys are standard polynomially secure and c sk is formed on the same system parameter n.
We consider two experiments: E 0 and E 1 . For each µ ∈ {0, 1}, E µ mimics the experiment E i (specified in the security analysis in Section 7.1), with the following exceptions: E µ uses s µ as its witness in Stage-1 interactions (note that (s 0 , s 1 ) is included in sta) ; and the coins used by E µ for internal emulation of the proof stages are randomly and independently chosen (i.e., they are independent of the coins included in sta); The coins for the first-stages of V and P * are still those fixed in sta, with respect to which we suppose Case-2 will occur with non-negligible probability. Suppose Case-2 occurs with non-negligible probability, then there must exist a bit µ such that applying the (stand-alone) knowledge-extractor on E µ will output the preimage of y µ with nonnegligible probability. Otherwise, Case-2 will trivially occur with negligible probability. Without loss of generality, we assume µ = 0. That is, the knowledge-extractor on E 0 outputs the preimage of y 0 with non-negligible probability (and outputs the preimage of y 1 with negligible probability due to the one-wayness of f ). Now we consider the output of the knowledge-extractor on E 1 : first, it outputs the preimage of y 0 also with negligible probability; thus, with non-negligible probability (as we assume Case-2 occurs with non-negligible probability and Stage-1 interactions are WI), the knowledge-extractor on E 1 outputs either the preimage of y 1 or the witness for some x ∈ L where x is the common input of the i-th session in E 1 . Note that x is not necessarily the same x i in E i as the coins used by E µ are not the same as those of E i .
Note. Here, we cannot directly conclude that the knowledge-extractor on E 1 will certainly output the preimage of y 1 with non-negligible probability, as we cannot rely on the assumption that x ∈ L. This point complicates the security analysis, and is one underlying reason for requiring the complexity leveraging. Now, we want to contradict the statistical WI property of Stage-1. We define a series of hybrid mental experiments H 1 , · · · , H s(n) as follows: for any k, 1 ≤ k ≤ s(n), H k mimics the behavior of E 0 but with the following exceptions: In Stage-1 of the first k sessions H k uses s 1 as its witness; and in Stage-1 of the rest s(n) − k sessions it uses s 0 as the witness. Note that H 0 equals the experiment E 0 , and H s(n) equals the experiment E 1 . As we assume that the (stand-alone) knowledge-extractor on H 0 (= E 0 ) will output the preimage of y 0 with non-negligible probability (but output the preimage of y 1 with negligible probability), and that the knowledge-extractor on H s(n) (= E 1 ) will output either a preimage of y 1 or a witness for some x ∈ L with non-negligible probability (but output the preimage of y 0 only with negligible probability). By hybrid arguments, we conclude that there must exist a k, 1 ≤ k ≤ s(n), such that the knowledge-extractor on H k−1 outputs the preimage of y 0 with non-negligible probability and the knowledge-extractor on H k outputs the preimage of y 0 with negligible probability (and outputs the preimage of y 1 or a witness for some x ∈ L with non-negligible probability). Recall that, in all the experiments, the (stand-alone) knowledge-extractor is to extract the knowledge for the statement whose validity was successfully conveyed in the i-th session. Then we attempt to break the statistical WI property or Stage-1, by considering another experiment B.
B mimics H k with the following exceptions: The Stage-1 interactions of the k-th session are no longer emulated internally, but interacting externally with an external knowledge-proverP k who uses s δ as the witness for a random bit δ. Note that, ifP k uses s 1 as its witness then the experiment B is identical to H k , and ifP k uses s 0 as its witness then B is identical to H k−1 . Now, we consider two cases:
Case-2.1. The external interactions withP k have finished before the sending of the random challenge (i.e., the second-round message) of Stage-3 of the i-th session.
Case-2.2. The external interactions withP k have not finished on the sending of the random challenge of Stage-3 of the i-th session. Note that the concurrent interleaving and malleating attack described in Section 4.2 is just a demonstration of this case.
If Case-2.1 occurs, we break the WI property of Stage-1 as follows: Note that in this case, applying the stand-alone knowledge-extractor on (the i-th session in) B does not incur rewinding the interactions withP k . We can combine the stand-alone knowledge-extractor and the internal emulation of B into a stand-alone (expected polynomial-time) knowledge-verifier interacting witĥ P k . If the knowledge-extractor outputs the preimage of y 0 , then we also output 0; in any other case, we output a random bit. According to the above hybrid arguments, ifP k uses s 0 as its witness, then we will output 0 with probability that is non-negligibly bigger than 1/2; on the other hand, ifP k uses s 1 as its witness, then we will output 0 with probability negligibly close to 1/2. Furthermore, using Markov's inequality, standard technique (as is done in [65, 73] ) shows that: if the WI property holds w.r.t. any strict polynomial-time algorithm it also holds with any expected polynomial-time algorithm. This contradicts the WI property of the underlying protocol. Note that computational WI of Stage-1 is sufficient for ruling out Case-2.1.
If Case-2.2 occurs, we further distinguish two cases according to the output of the knowledgeextractor on H k . Recall that we have assumed that the output of the knowledge-extractor on H k is the preimage of y 0 only with negligible probability, and the output of the stand-alone knowledgeextractor on H k−1 is the preimage of y 0 with non-negligible probability.
Case-2.2.1. With negligible probability the output of the (stand-alone) knowledge-extractor on H k is s 1 (i.e., the output is always a witness for some x ∈ L of the i-th session in H k ). This case can be partially illustrated by the Adversarial-Strategy-1 demonstrated in Section 7.2.1.
Note. It is easy to see that, suppose the common input x of the i-th session in H k is false, i.e., x ∈ L, then Case-2.2.1 can appear at most with negligible probability. We note that partial witness independent WI (employed in the works of [24, 20, 21] ) seems to be insufficient even for correct knowledge-extraction for individual statements (recall that our CKE formulation is w.r.t. joint knowledge-extraction for all statements whose validity was successfully conveyed in the concurrent sessions). This point was not addressed in existing works. In particular, with respect to the Adversarial-Strategy-1, in this case the knowledge-extractor will extract a secret-key s 0 with non-negligible probability when it simulates Stage-1 interactions with s 0 as the witness, which indicates the failure of correct knowledge-extraction even for any individual statement.
Case-2.2.2. With non-negligible probability the output of the stand-alone knowledge-extractor on H k is the preimage of y 1 . This case can be partially illustrated by Adversarial-Strategy-2 demonstrated in Section 7.2.1.
Note. Again, suppose the common input x of the i-th session in H k is false, i.e., x ∈ L, then Case-2.2.2 can appear at most with negligible probability. Otherwise, the value committed in c
sk indicates the secret-key used in Stage-1 interactions. Recall that we have assumed that the output of the knowledge-extractor on H k is the preimage of y 0 only with negligible probability, and the output of the stand-alone knowledge-extractor on H k−1 is the preimage of y 0 with non-negligible probability. Specifically, suppose the witness used for Stage-1 interactions is s b , then the successful i-th session with c Remark. Although it intuitively seems that Case-2.2 (in particular, the exemplifying adversarial strategies) could not occur with non-negligible probability, it (and particularly the exemplifying adversarial strategies presented in Section 7.2.1) could indeed be potential, as we do not employ any non-malleable building tools and we are actually facing a concurrent MIM. We do not know how to provably rule out such possibilities, without resorting to the complexity leveraging on c sk .
On the necessity of double commitments
To show the necessity of the double commitments c w and c sk used in Stage-2 of the efficient CZK-CKE protocol depicted in Figure 2 , we demonstrate concrete attacks against variants of the protocol without either c w or c sk , where WIA/POK protocols are implemented by Σ OR -protocols.
The attack against variant protocol without c w
The variant protocol without c w , which amounts to the CZK protocols of [76, 20] , is re-depicted in Figure 3 (page 30).
Σ OR -based protocol variant without c w P, V Key Generation. Let f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be any OWF where n is the security parameter. Each verifier V selects random strings s 0 , s 1 from {0, 1}
n , randomly selects a bit b ← {0, 1}, computes y b = f (s b ) and sets y 1−b = f (s 1−b ). V registers P K = (y 0 , y 1 ) in a public file F as its public-key, and keeps SK = s b as its secret-key.
Common input. An element x ∈ L∩{0, 1} poly(n) . Denote by R L the corresponding N P-relation for L.
P private input. An N P-witness w ∈ {0, 1} poly(n) for x ∈ L.
Stage-1. V proves to P that it knows the preimage of either y 0 or y 1 , by running a Σ OR -protocol on the input (y 0 , y 1 ) in which V plays the role of the knowledge prover. The witness used by V in this stage is s b . Denote by a V , e V , z V , the first-round, the second-round and the third-round message of the Σ OR -protocol, respectively.
Stage-2. If V successfully finishes Stage-1, P does the following: it computes c sk = C(0 n , r sk ), where C is a perfectly-binding commitment scheme and r sk is the randomness used for commitments.
Then, P proves to V that it knows a witness for (x, y 0 , y 1 , c sk ) ∈ L ′ , by running a Σ OR -protocol (i.e., the OR-proofs of Σ-protocols). The witness used by P is w such that (x, w) ∈ R L . We denote by a P , e P , z P , the first-round, the second-round, and the third-round message of the Σ OR -protocol of this stage, respectively. On the implementations of Σ OR . For the Σ OR -based protocol variant depicted in Figure 3 , to get statistical WI of Stage-1 there are two ways: In particular, we can require the underlying OWF f used in the key-generation stage admits perfect/statistical Σ-protocols, and thus the Σ OR of Stage-1 is perfect/statistical WI; In general, the variant of (the n-parallel repetition of) Blum's protocol for DHC, where the statistically-binding commitments used in the first round are replaced by the one-round statistically-hiding commitments based on collision-resistant hash functions, is a statistical Σ-protocol (as well as statistical WI argument) for N P, and thus can be applied to any N P language under the assumption of collision-resistant hash functions.
LetL be any N P-language admitting a Σ-protocol that is denoted by ΣL (in particular,L can be an empty set). For an honest verifier V with its public-key P K = (y 0 , y 1 ), we define a new language L = {(x, y 0 , y 1 )|∃w s.t. (x, w) ∈ RL ∨ ∃(w, b) s.t. y b = f (w) ∧ b ∈ {0, 1}}. Note that for any stringx (whetherx ∈L or not), the statement "(x, y 0 , y 1 ) ∈ L" is always true as P K = (y 0 , y 1 ) is honestly generated. Also note that L is a language that admits Σ-protocols (as Σ OR -protocol is itself a Σ-protocol). Now, we describe the concurrent interleaving and malleating attack, in which P * successfully convinces the honest verifier of the statement "(x, y 0 , y 1 ) ∈ L" for any arbitrary poly(n)-bit stringx (even whenx ∈L) by concurrently interacting with V in two sessions as follows.
1. P * initiates the first session with V . After receiving the first-round message, denoted by a ′ V , of the Σ OR -protocol of Stage-1 of the first session on common input (y 0 , y 1 ) (i.e., V 's public-key), P * suspends the first session.
2. P * initiates a second session with V , and works just as the honest prover does in Stage-1 and Stage-2. We denote by c sk the Stage-2 message of the second session (i.e., c sk commits to 0 n ). When P * moves into Stage-3 of the second session and needs to send V the first-round message, denoted by a P , of the Σ OR -protocol of Stage-3 of the second session on common input (x, y 0 , y 1 , c sk ), P * does the following:
• P * first runs the SHVZK simulator of ΣL (i.e., the Σ-protocol forL) onx to get a simulated conversation, denoted by (ax, ex, zx), for the (possibly false) statement "x ∈ L". Then, P * runs the SHVZK simulator of the underlying Σ-protocol for N P on (y 0 , y 1 , c sk ) to get a simulated conversation, denoted by (a sk , e sk , z sk ), for the (false) statement "∃(w, r sk , b) s.t. c sk = C(w, r sk ) ∧ y b = f (w) ∧ b ∈ {0, 1}".
• P * sets a P = (ax, a ′ V , a sk ) and sends a P to V as the first-round message of the Σ ORprotocol of Stage-3 of the second session, where a ′ V is the one received by P * in the first session.
• After receiving the second-round message of Stage-3 of the second session, denoted by e P (i.e., the random challenge from V ), P * sets e ′ V = e P ⊕ ex ⊕ e sk and then suspends the second session.
3. P continues the first session, and sends e ′ V = e P ⊕ ex ⊕ e sk as the second-round message of the Σ OR -protocol of Stage-1 of the first session.
4. After receiving the third-round message of the Σ OR -protocol of Stage-1 of the first session, denoted by z ′ V , P * suspends the first session again.
5. P * continues the execution of the second session again, and sends z P = ((ex, zx), (e ′ V , z ′ V ), (e sk , z sk )) to V as the last-round message of the second session.
Note that (ax, ex, zx) is an accepting conversation for the (possibly false) statement "x ∈L", (a ′ V , e ′ V , z ′ V ) is an accepting conversation for showing the knowledge of the preimage of either y 0 or y 1 , (a sk , e sk , z sk ) is an accepting conversation for the statement "∃(w, r sk , b) s.t. c sk = C(w, r sk )∧y b = f (w)∧b ∈ {0, 1}", and furthermore ex⊕e ′ V ⊕e sk = e P . According to the description of Σ OR (presented in Section 2), this means that, from the viewpoint of V , (a P , e P , z P ) is an accepting conversation of Stage-3 of the second-session on common input (x, y 0 , y 1 ). That is, P * successfully convinced V of the statement "(x, y 0 , y 1 ) ∈ L" (even forx ∈L) in the second session but without knowing any corresponding N P-witness.
The attack against variant protocol without c sk
The variant protocol without c sk is re-depicted in Figure 4 (page 32). Now, we describe the concurrent interleaving and malleating attack, in which P * successfully convinces the honest verifier of the statement "x ∈ L", for any n-bit string x and for any N Planguage L, without knowing any N P-witness by concurrently interacting with V in two sessions as follows.
2. P * initiates a second session with V , and works just as the honest prover does in Stage-1.
In Stage-2 of the second session, P * sends c w = C(0 n ) (rather than C(w) as honest prover does). When P * moves into Stage-3 of the second session and needs to send V the first-round message, denoted by a P , of the Σ OR -protocol of Stage-3 of the second session on common input (x, y 0 , y 1 , c w ), P * does the following:
Σ OR -based protocol variant without c sk P, V Key Generation. Let f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be any OWF, where n is the security parameter. Each verifier V selects random strings s 0 , s 1 from {0, 1}
Common input. An element x ∈ L ∩ {0, 1} n . Denote by R L the corresponding N P-relation for L.
P private input. An N P-witness w ∈ {0, 1} n for x ∈ L. Here, we assume w.l.o.g. that the witness for any x ∈ L ∩ {0, 1} n is of the same length n.
Stage-2. If V successfully finishes Stage-1, P does the following: it computes c w = C(w, r w ), where C is a perfectly-binding commitment scheme and r w is the randomness used for commitments.
Stage-3. Define a new N P-language L ′ = {(x, y 0 , y 1 , c w )|(∃(w, r w ) s.t. c w = C(w, r w ) ∧ (x, w) ∈ R L ) ∨ (∃(w, b) s.t. y b = f (w) ∧ b ∈ {0, 1})}. Then, P proves to V that it knows a witness for (x, y 0 , y 1 , c w ) ∈ L ′ , by running a Σ OR -protocol. The witness used by P is (w, r w ). We denote by a P , e P , z P , the first-round, the second-round, and the third-round message of the Σ OR -protocol of this stage, respectively. • P * first runs the SHVZK simulator of the underlying Σ-protocol for N P on common input (x, c w ) to get a simulated conversation, denoted by (a x , e x , z x ), for the (false) statement "∃(w, r w ) s.t. c w = C(w, r w ) ∧ (x, w) ∈ R L )".
• P * sets a P = (a x , a ′ V ) and sends a P to V as the first-round message of the Σ OR -protocol of Stage-3 of the second session, where a ′ V is the one received by P * in the first session.
• After receiving the second-round message of Stage-3 of the second session, denoted by e P (i.e., the random challenge from V ), P * sets e ′ V = e P ⊕ e x and then suspends the second session.
3. P continues the first session, and sends e ′ V = e P ⊕ e x as the second-round message of the Σ OR -protocol of Stage-1 of the first session.
5. P * continues the execution of the second session again, and sends z P = ((e x , z x ), (e ′ V , z ′ V )) to V as the last-round message of the second session.
Note that (a x , e x , z x ) is an accepting conversation for the (false) statement "∃(w, r w ) s.t. c w = C(w, r w ) ∧ (x, w) ∈ R L )", (a ′ V , e ′ V , z ′ V ) is an accepting conversation for showing the knowledge of the preimage of either y 0 or y 1 , and furthermore e x ⊕ e ′ V = e P . According to the description of Σ OR (presented in Section 2), this means that, from the viewpoint of V , (a P , e P , z P ) is an accepting conversation of Stage-3 of the second-session on common input x. That is, P * successfully convinced V of the statement "x ∈ L" but without knowing any corresponding N P-witness.
Practical instantiations
In the (round-optimal) practical instantiations of the efficient CZK-CKE protocol, the verifier uses the sub-exponentially secure DLP OWF in key-generation stage: f p,q,g (x) = g x mod p, where p and q are primes, p = 2q + 1 and |p| = n, and g is an element of Z * p of order q. We also assume the (standard polynomial-time) DDH assumption holds on the cyclic group indexed by (p, q, g) (i.e., the sub-group of order q of Z * p ). The admissible common input is x ∈ Z * p of order q and the corresponding witness is w ∈ Z q such that g w = x mod p. We remark that the parameters (p, g, g) , specifying the f p,q,g and the admissible common inputs, are set outside the system.
The statistical WIPOK of Stage-1 is replaced by the Σ OR of Schnorr's basic protocol for DLP [68] . The perfectly-binding commitment scheme of Stage-2 is replaced by the DDH-based ElGamal (non-interactive) commitment scheme [29] (recalled in Section 2). To commit to a value v ∈ Z q , the committer randomly selects u, r ∈ Z q , computes h = g u mod p and sends (h,ḡ = g r ,h = g v h r ) as the commitment.
For the practical Σ-protocol of Stage-3, by the Σ OR -technique we need the following two practical Σ-protocols:
• A practical Σ-protocol that, given x, c w = (h,ḡ,h), proves the knowledge of (w, r) such that x = g w mod p andḡ = g r mod p andh = g w h r mod p.
• A practical Σ-protocol that, given y 0 , y 1 , c sk = (h,ḡ sk ,h sk ), proves the knowledge (w, r) such that either y 0 = g w mod p andḡ sk = g r mod p andh sk = g w h r mod p or y 1 = g w mod p andḡ sk = g r mod p andh sk = g w h r mod p.
Again, by the Σ OR -technique, if we have a practical Σ-protocol of the first type, then we can also have a practical Σ-protocol of the second type. Thus, to get the practical CZK-CKE implementation, all we need now is to develop a practical Σ-protocol of the first type. Based on the Σ-protocol for DLP [68] , such Σ-protocol is described below.
Common input: (p, q, g, x, h,ḡ,h), where x, h,ḡ,h are all elements of order q in Z * p .
Prover's private input: w, r ∈ Z q such that x = g w mod p andḡ = g r mod p andh = g w h r mod p.
Round-1:
The prover P randomly selects t ∈ Z q , computes a 0 = g t mod p and a 1 = h t mod p, sends (a 0 , a 1 ) to the verifier V .
Round-2: V responds back a random challenge e taken randomly from Z q .
Round-3: P computes z 0 = t + we mod q and z 1 = t + re mod q, and sends back (z 0 , z 1 ) to V .
Verifier's decision: V accepts if and only if: g z 0 = a 0 x e mod p and g z 1 = a 0ḡ e mod p and h z 1 = a 1 (h/x) e mod p.
We give a brief analysis of the above Σ-protocol: Special soundness: From two accepting conversations w.r.t. the same Round-1 message, {(a 0 , a 1 ), e, (z 0 , z 1 )} and {(a 0 , a 1 ), e ′ , (z ′ 0 , z ′ 1 )}, we can compute w = z 0 −z ′ 0 e−e ′ , and r = z 1 −z ′ 1 e−e ′ . Special HVZK: The SHVZK simulator S works as follows: on a given random challenge e ∈ Z q , it randomly selects z 0 , z 1 from Z q , then it sets a 0 = g z 0 x −e and a 1 = g z 1ḡ −e = h z 1 (h/x) −e .
We remark that, although the above practical implementation is for specific number-theoretic language, it is indeed very useful in practical scenarios.
